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BOOK REVIEWS
Merrill on Notice. By Maurice H. Merrill.1 Kansas City: Vernon Law
Book Co., 1952. 3 vols., pp. xl, 2285. $45.00
In 1926 Dr. Maurice H. Merrill joined the faculty of the University
of Nebraska Law School and took over the course in Agency previously
taught by a most eminent authority in that field, Dean Warren A.
Seavey. The meticulous scholarship of Dean Seavey undoubtedly was
an inspiration to his successor, for in the years that followed Professor
Merrill, both in the classroom and in print, demonstrated his complete
grasp of the subject of Agency. Within a year Professor Merrill published the concluding section of an important series of articles on
Agency commenced by Dean Seavey which had appeared in early
issues of the Nebraska Law Bulletin. 2 Ten years later, in 1936, Dr.
Merrill published two significant articles in which he sketched in broad
outline the "anatomy of notice" and "unforgettable knowledge," 3 which
together were a partial synopsis of the treatise finally published in
1952. Former students and lawyers in Nebraska and Oklahoma, long
familiar with Dr. Merrill's outstanding scholarship and analytical
ability, will receive personal pleasure and satisfaction in the appearance
of Notice.
This product of a twenty-five year period of gestation is monumental and unique. It is monumental in that the treatise will long
endure as a memorial to a careful, practical and wise scholar; it is unique in that Professor Merrill has cut across traditional categories of
law and gathered together in one schematic whole components which
theretofore had been isolated in divers strata. In this systematic work,
the rather obscure elements of notice, knowledge and notification
which had been engulfed in the law of procedure, property, criminal
law, administrative law, torts, contracts, etc., have been subtracted
from alien masses and woven together into a new unified whole so that
they take on new content and meaning.
In this process of distillation and compagination it was found that
the old terminology was inadequate and ambiguous, so a new nomenclature was devised. In lieu of the old dichotomy of "actual and constructive" notice, the terms "cognitive" (knowledge) and "absolute"
(notification) are used in order to clarify the concepts. "Cognitive
notice" includes knowledge, facts putting one on inquiry (reason to
know), and notification which need not be remembered. "Absolute
'Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma since 1936. Professor of Law,
University of Nebraska, 1926-1936.
2Seavey, Agency, 1 Neb. L. Bull. (No. 4) 5 (1923); Seavey, Agency, 2 Neb. L.
Bull. (No. 1) 5 (1923); Merrill, Agency, 6 Neb L. Bull. 135 (1927).
3Merrill, The Anatomy of Notice, 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 417 (1936); Merrill,
Unforgettable Knowledge, 34 Mich. L. Rev. 474 (1936).
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notice" is subdivided into notification (formal or by performance of
an act creating notice), unforgettable knowledge, and facts which one
is under a duty to know. 4
In justifying the adoption of new terminology, Professor Merrill
points out:
A classification apparently most favored in the past by judges and
writers divides the subject into actual notice and constructive notice ....
There has been so much confusion and ambiguity in the application of
these terms that it seems undesirable to accept them as the basis for a
thorough analysis of the notice concept .... This distinction apparently

made by these cases is between notice arising from knowledge or direct
communication and notice arising in every other manner.... The result
is that, by failing to discriminate between notice based on knowledge and
that based either on formality or on imperative legal policy, the distinction between notice actual and constructive fails to account for the most
significant differences in the law of notice. When we add to this the
variant sense in which the terms have been applied by different courts,
the reasons for discarding the terminology, as far as possible, are manifest....
5

As vouchsafed by the author, "this is a book of principles rather
than a digest or encyclopedia." Throughout the development of his subject, Dr. Merrill points to the policy or value factors underlying principles of law, and comments, suggests, approves or disapproves of
principles and their applications. There is constructive criticism of
cases and authorities, an analysis of precedents, and at times a prediction of trends. The author's familiarity with innumerable fields of
law, his reading of thousands of cases, and his great gift for legal
analysis, will invoke respectiful attention to his views.
Enough has been said to indicate that both imagination and scholarship went into Notice. In addition, the treatise fills a practical need
and gives a pragmatic treatment to its subject. As pointed out in the
Preface, a busy lawyer cannot get through a week without touching
upon notice in some way. But before these volumes were published
there was no complete and unified treatment of the subject, no systematic analysis of the problems.
The lawyer today needs to consider such matters as the distinction between cognitive and absolute notice; under what conditions knowledge,
including the perception of inquiry-provoking facts, will serve as a substitute for notification; what are the necessary elements of notification;
what information is legally forgettable; the requisites of notification by
mail, publication, or by posting; the essentials of emanation and authentication in respect to notification; the concepts of waiver and frustration of
' As pointed out by Dr. Merrill, this terminology is adopted with amendments and modifications from that used by Dean Seavey. See Seavey, Notice
Through An Agent, 65 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1916); Restatement, Agency § 9
(1933).
'l Merrill, Notice 10-11 (1952).

